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THE NEW LOCALISM IN WELFARE ADVOCACY 
MATTHEW DILLER* 
Much ink has been spilled examining and critiquing various modes of 
advocacy that lawyers for the poor use, don’t use, or are alleged to use.1  When 
it comes to poverty law, it seems that the landscape is filled with arm chair 
generals, Monday morning quarterbacks and back seat drivers all advising, 
criticizing and mixing metaphors in a cacophonous din.  Accordingly, I 
hesitate to offer another contribution to this literature.  I will restrict myself to 
a single point—forms of advocacy cannot be considered apart from the legal 
structure and context of the object of advocacy.  This point seems obvious, but 
observers seldom draw this connection, concentrating instead on issues that are 
internal to the advocacy process, such as the relationship between advocates 
and clients.  Second, a corollary to this point: As the legal structures shift and 
evolve, methods of advocacy must also adapt to these changing circumstances. 
This essay elaborates on this point and its corollary by examining forms of 
advocacy in the area of welfare.  First, it points out the connection between the 
advocacy forms favored by poverty lawyers and the structure of the Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program.  In particular, it shows 
how AFDC and the class action went hand in hand.  The centralized and rule 
based structure of AFDC made it particularly susceptive to class action 
litigation.  Next, this essay discusses the growing criticism of the class action 
as a tool for social reform, and the implications of this criticism for welfare 
advocacy.  Finally, this essay examines the structure of welfare as it is 
emerging from the process of welfare reform and highlights some of the 
ramifications of these changes for welfare advocacy.  As the welfare system 
becomes increasingly decentralized and fragmented, critical decisions are 
increasingly made on the local level.  Accordingly, effective advocacy must 
also be structured to influence decisions locally.  Successful advocacy will 
depend on identifying the loci of decision making in the new regime of welfare 
and exploiting or creating opportunities to exert influence at these points. 
 
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. 
 1. For a compilation of scholarly writing about the practice of poverty law, see 
Bibliography to the Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to Low Income Persons: 
Professional and Ethical Issues, 67 FORD. L. REV. 2731 (1999). 
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1. AFDC and the Law Reform Model 
In the 1960s, the law reform model of advocacy emerged as the dominant 
means used by poverty lawyers to effect social change.2  The law reform 
model posited that social change can be brought about through test cases and 
class action litigation.  Analogizing from the litigation strategy of civil rights 
activists, poverty lawyers sought to use the courts to establish core principles 
concerning the rights of people in poverty and to implement and enforce these 
principles through judicial decree.  The test case model was first applied in the 
poverty law context by Edward Sparer and the Center for Social Welfare 
Policy and Law.3  As used by its progenitors, the test case model focused 
heavily on the goal of establishing welfare rights, and many of the most well 
known cases brought by poverty lawyers dealt with the subject of welfare.4 
Public benefit programs were a natural fit with this advocacy strategy.  
First, the programs were run by large government agencies, so that advocacy 
for systemic change could target a single institution.  A change in policy by a 
welfare agency affects thousands of people.  In contrast, in many other areas of 
vital importance to people in poverty, social conditions can only be altered by 
changing the conduct of thousands of individuals.  In the important areas of 
health care, housing, and employment, the critical decisions affecting poor 
individuals and communities are principally made by large numbers of private 
parties that cannot possibly be subjected to a single court decree.  These 
problems are polycentric, resulting from the interplay of individuals, market 
forces, and institutional constraints.  They fit poorly into the traditional bi-
polar rubric of litigation, which requires one or more similarly situated 
plaintiffs who are pitted in opposition to no more than a few defendants.5  It is 
by no means clear who one sues in order to create rights to housing, health care 
or jobs for people in need. 
This is not to say that the law reform model could not be used in these 
fields.  The judicial recognition of the warranty of habitability and other rights 
 
 2. See MARTHA DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS & THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
(1993); Allen Redlich, Who Will Litigate Constitutional Issues for the Poor?, 19 HASTINGS 
CONST. L. Q. 745 (1992). 
 3. Martha Davis’ fascinating history of the Center for Social Welfare Policy and Law 
provides a thorough examination of how Sparer and his colleagues borrowed and adapted the 
approach of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.  See DAVIS, supra note 2. 
 4. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) 
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). For a comprehensive discussion of law reform litigation in the 
area of welfare, see Barbara Sard, The Role of the Courts in Welfare Litigation, 22 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 367 (1988). See generally SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: 
INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS (1994). 
 5. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281 (1976). 
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for tenants shows that the law reform strategy could yield benefits even in 
these areas.6  But the impact of litigation victories in a field such as housing is 
inherently difficult to ascertain.  The task of improving housing conditions in a 
given city or state depends on changing the conduct of tens of thousands of 
independent landlords.  In housing and other areas, advocates attempted to 
overcome the problem of polycentricity by concentrating on the portions of the 
issue in which government is heavily involved.  For example, poverty lawyers 
have focused on public housing7 and public funding for health care through the 
Medicaid program.8  Although both of these focuses achieved important gains, 
they provided only a limited perspective on these problems that did not really 
strike at their heart.  In contrast, the welfare system seemed tailor-made for the 
law reform approach.  A lawsuit directed at the administrators of a state AFDC 
program, or at the Department of Health and Human Services could produce a 
judicial order requiring, in one swoop, that all applicants or recipients be 
treated in a new and different manner. 
In addition, by the late 1960s the AFDC program became increasingly 
rule-based.9  Prior to that point, the program was administered through a social 
work model, in which critical decisions were left to the professional discretion 
of case workers.10  Thus, even though the programs were administered by 
single agencies, the agencies themselves relied on comparatively few fixed 
rules.  The increasingly rule-based nature of the welfare system facilitated the 
reliance on litigation-based advocacy strategies in a number of ways.  First, in 
 
 6. See, e.g., Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (finding 
implied warranty of habitability in leases for rental apartments).  Cf., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 
U.S. 56 (1972) (rejecting due process challenge to summary eviction procedure). 
 7. See, e.g., Miles v. Metropolitan Dade Co., 916 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
502 U.S. 898 (1991)  (class action challenging housing authority practice of charging tenants for 
court costs in unsuccessful eviction proceedings); Durrett v. Housing Authority of the City of 
Providence, 896 F.2d 600 (1st Cir. 1990) (approving consent decree in class action challenge to 
conditions in public housing).  I do not mean to suggest the poverty lawyers have ignored issues 
relating to private sector low income housing, only that they have recognized that a focus on 
public or subsidized housing can leverage their limited resources. 
 8. See, e.g., Boatman v. Hammons, 164 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 1998) (class action challenging 
improper notice of denials of Medicaid assistance for transportation expenses); Catanzano v. 
Wing, 103 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 1996) (class action challenging reduction in Medicaid home health 
care); Alexander v. Britt, 89 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 1996) (declining to modify consent decree setting 
deadlines for processing Medicaid applications). 
 9. See William Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy & Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 
1198 (1983).  It could be argued that the shift to a rule based system was itself the product of 
poverty law advocacy.  Although this point has some validity, in the late 1960s, increasing 
reliance on rules was a general trend in administration.  See Richard Pierce, Rulemaking and the 
APA, 32 TULSA L.J. 185, 188-91 (1996).  See also KENNETH DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A 
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 52-96 (1969) (arguing for increased use of fixed rules as a means of 
constraining administrative discretion). 
 10. See Simon, supra note 9, at 1201-1203. 
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a rule-based system, agency policies are more easily discerned and therefore 
more readily challenged in litigation.  In the absence of formal rules, the 
operative policies of a welfare agency cannot be challenged unless they are 
uncovered and their existence proven, a process often difficult and resource 
intensive.11 
Second, the multiple tiers of authority in the AFDC program resulted in 
many different sources of rules.  Each program was subject to a federal statute 
and regulations, as well as a state statute and regulations.  Conflicts between 
these many sources of authority provided a fertile source for legal claims that 
could be exploited in the court room to the benefit of recipients.12  Moreover, 
the legal claims arising from these conflicts fell well within the ambit of 
traditional judicial functions.  Many of the cases required only the traditional 
judicial function of statutory interpretation, deciding whether one set of rules 
complies with another set.  AFDC litigation seldom broke new ground at the 
remedial stage, as ongoing judicial supervision of welfare administration was 
seldom ordered.  In a rule based system, an injunction generally led to the 
recission of one rule and the substitution of a revised version in its stead.13  
Welfare class actions rarely tested the remedial powers of the courts in the 
same way as litigation over prison conditions, treatment of residents of long 
term care facilities, or school desegregation. 
Finally, the rule based structure of the AFDC program facilitated the use of 
the class action.  Because large numbers of individuals could be harmed by a 
single rule of general applicability, class certification requirements were easily 
met.  The prerequisites of typicality, commonality and numerosity were not 
difficult to fulfill in such a context.14 
Many have written about the allure of litigation as an apparent “magic 
bullet” for dispatching social problems.15  In the context of welfare advocacy, 
however, the focus on litigation also had some grounding in reality.  The 
structure of the AFDC program made welfare a particularly fertile ground for 
test case and class action litigation, and poverty lawyers exploited this match 
the fullest extent that they could. 
 
 11. Agencies frequently claim that less formal means of instruction such as guidelines or 
training materials do not constitute binding policy statements and thus do not reflect the official 
position of the agency. 
 12. See, e.g., Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 
(1970); Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974); Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1974).  See 
generally Sard, supra note 4 (explaining how welfare litigation shifted from a focus on 
constitutional challenges to statutory claims after the decision in Dandridge v. Williams). 
 13. The Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from 
ordering retroactive payments of benefits to recipients.  See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 
(1974); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). 
 14. See Fed. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 15. See generally GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 336-343 (1991) (concluding 
that “courts act as ‘fly paper’ for social references who succumb to the ‘lure of litigation’”). 
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2. Critique of the Law Reform Model 
Over the years, academics and poverty lawyers have become increasingly 
aware of the shortcomings of the law reform model.  In fact, much of the 
writing on poverty lawyering consists of a cataloging of the deficiencies in 
litigation as a vehicle for social change.16  In the place of litigation based 
strategies, critics have counseled poverty lawyers to focus on building low 
income communities by nurturing grass roots activism and helping to build 
community institutions.17  This approach seeks to empower poor communities 
to achieve their own ends, with the lawyer serving principally as a resource of 
knowledge and expertise. 
The critics of the law reform model focused on the fact that litigation based 
strategies of necessity place the lawyer in the forefront of the effort.18  The idea 
of effecting sweeping change through the vehicle of a class action law suit, 
often rests on the image of the lawyer as hero—a savior who brings justice to 
the masses.  The prominence of the lawyer in his arrangement, however, does 
not further the development of leadership and organization that is indigenous 
to the community served.19  Indeed, some have argued that litigation strategies 
may have the negative consequence of encouraging reformers to look to the 
courts for salvation rather than doing the hard work necessary to mount a 
political or public relations campaign.20  Critics have also pointed out that the 
law reform model favors a focus on issues that can be addressed through 
litigation, rather than on the needs of the community.21  The question of 
whether there is a legal claim and how strong it is may take precedence over 
the question of which problem is most urgent or central to the lives of clients. 
Inherent in these criticisms is a belief that litigation strategies cannot, or 
frequently do not, yield results that are sufficiently compelling to outweigh 
these drawbacks.  Accordingly, many critics have also questioned whether 
litigation can really bring about lasting gains for people in poverty.  When 
courts order the expansion of substantive or procedural rights, adversaries can 
respond by toughening the system at other points.  Litigation for social change 
can be seen as a battle with Hydra – as one head is stricken off, two more take 
its place.  Examples of this pattern can be readily identified in the area of 
welfare, where Congress overruled a string of litigation successes by amending 
 
 16. See, e.g., GERALD LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISON OF 
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Anthony Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 
HASTINGS L.J. 769 (1992); Lucie White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Dreifontein on 
Lawyering and Power, 43 WISC. L. REV. 699 (1988). 
 17. See, e.g., LOPEZ, supra note 16, at 32-38. 
 18. See id. at 14-16 (describing how a test case lawyer chooses the clients to fit the case, 
rather than the other way around). 
 19. See White, supra note 16, at 755. 
 20. Id. at 742; Alfieri, supra note 16, at 837-838. 
 21. White, supra note 16, at 757. 
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the Social Security Act and adding provisions that were even more harsh than 
those originally challenged.22 
As I have argued elsewhere, these critiques can be overdrawn.  Litigation 
strategies can yield positive results for poor clients.23  It is difficult to contest 
the proposition that lawsuits such as Shapiro v. Thompson24 and King v. 
Smith25 yielded many rewards for poor families. 
More importantly, the drawbacks of litigation must be considered in light 
of the difficulties that accompany the alternative approaches.  Litigation has 
proven attractive precisely because the political process has often looked so 
bleak.26  In a system dominated by money, it is not surprising that poor 
communities generally fare poorly in the political arena.  Not only do poor 
people lack the resources to gain political clout, they are frequently targets of 
blame for many social ills.  The focus on litigation can be seen as an attempt to 
appeal to the arm of government that is least influenced by money and social 
scapegoating.  Although the judiciary is far from immune from either of these 
influences,27 it strives to appear as a neutral arbiter of the rule of law.  Poor 
people can and do win in court. 
Nonetheless, the critique of litigation is not without force, particularly as a 
caution against an exclusive or reflexive reliance on litigation based strategies.  
The limits of litigation call for a diversification of approaches, rather than 
abandonment of the lawsuit as a vehicle for seeking social change.28  This 
recognition of the limits of litigation based strategies together with growing 
reluctance of the judiciary to interfere with the administration of public benefit 
programs has posed a major challenge for advocates working on welfare and 
other public benefits programs. 
 
 22. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981) 
(amending Social Security Act to undo the result of several Supreme Court decisions favoring 
AFDC recipients). 
 23. See Matthew Diller, Poverty Lawyering in the Golden Age, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1401 
(1995); See also Lynn Kelly, Lawyering for Poor Communities on the Cusp of the Next Century, 
25 FORDHAM URBAN. L.J. 721 (1998). 
 24. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
 25. 392 U.S. 309 (1968). 
 26. See Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 
1277 (1993). 
 27. In many states judges are elected for fixed terms, and are thus dependent on campaign 
contributions.  See William Glaberson, Fierce Campaigns Signal New Era for State Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 5, 2000, at A1.  Few doubt the influence of ideology and public opinion on the 
judiciary.  Moreover, in the process of litigation wealthy repeat players enjoy advantages over 
impecunious individuals.  See Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on 
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC. 95 (1974). 
 28. See Paul Tremblay, Acting “A Very Moral Type of God:”  Triage Among Poor Clients, 
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475, 2514-17 (1999) (calling for poverty lawyers to seek a diversified 
portfolio of goals and methods). 
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The focus on community based advocacy, however, is not easily adapted to 
the field of public benefits.  After the collapse of the National Welfare Rights 
Movement, the prospects for assisting a grass roots movement aimed at 
improving the welfare system were bleak.29  The principal goal of recipients 
has always been to leave the rolls rather than to stay and fight to improve the 
welfare system.30  Moreover, even within poor communities welfare recipients 
are often marginalized.  Poor communities rarely rally around the issue of 
public benefits, in part, because such a focus may further stigmatize the 
community.  Community leaders are likely to steer clear of issues which 
suggest that their neighborhoods consists largely of welfare recipients. 
Finally, the structure of the AFDC program was not conducive to a 
community based approach.  Although some important problems with AFDC 
administration could be addressed at the local level, such as the treatment of 
applicants or recipients by staff, many of the key program decisions were made 
at the federal or state level.  The Social Security Act contained detailed 
requirements governing the treatment of income, work expenses, child support 
payments, and eligibility requirements.31  States set the benefit levels and 
chose among a variety of options left open to them by federal law.  Although 
states were given broader freedom in designing work and training requirements 
under the JOBS program,32 and this freedom sometimes translated down to 
localities, such programs never assumed major roles in the operation of the 
welfare system.  At most, only ten percent of adult recipients participated in 
JOBS programs.33  Local activism around welfare issues ran up against the 
reality that the centers of decision making in the AFDC program were, in many 
respects, not local at all. 
Thus, the movement toward community based lawyering has looked 
principally to issues other than public benefits.  Luke Cole, for example, has 
highlighted the potential of campaigns for environmental justice as a means of 
both improving life in poor communities and as a vehicle for nurturing 
community activism.34  Others have stressed the benefits of focusing on 
 
 29. See FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS 264-359 
(1977); Diller, supra note 23, at 1426-1427. 
 30. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY 15-20 (examining 
dynamic of deteriorating institutions or systems in which stakeholders choose to either abandon 
the institution or remain loyal and seek to improve it). 
 31. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (repealed 1996) (detailing state plan requirements). 
 32. See 42 U.S.C. § 682 (repealed 1996). 
 33. See COMMITTEE ON WAYS & MEANS, BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON 
PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 486 (1998) 
(reporting that in 1995 only 42.6 percent of adults receiving AFDC could be required to 
participate in the jobs program, and only 27 percent of these actually participated). 
 34. See Luke Cole, The Crisis and Opportunity in Public Interest Law: A Challenge to Law 
Students to be Rebellious Lawyers in the ‘90s, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 10-11 (1994); Luke Cole, 
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community economic development as a means of strengthening critical social 
and economic institutions in low income communities.35 
Advocates working on public benefits were largely left out of the 
movement toward community based strategies.  Indeed, the calls for a renewed 
emphasis on community building could have the effect of shifting advocacy 
resources away form work on public benefits issues in favor of other areas.  
Given the critical importance of public benefits, however, such a trend would 
be unfortunate. 
3. Advocacy in the New Welfare System 
A. The Emerging Structure of TANF 
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program is 
structured quite differently from its predecessor, the AFDC program.36  The 
TANF program eliminates most of the federal requirements that governed the 
AFDC program.  It contains no federal definition of eligibility and no federal 
rules for calculating income and resources.  States thus have vast freedom to 
design their own programs.  Indeed, rather than submitting state plans for 
federal approval, states only need submit “outlines” of their TANF programs 
for which no federal approval is required.37 
Many states are, in turn, delegating significant policymaking authority to 
localities and are contracting out portions of TANF administration.38  This 
second order devolution is prominent in states such as California, Ohio, 
Colorado, and North Carolina in which localities are given explicit policy 
making authority.39  In California and Colorado, TANF funds are provided to 
 
Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty 
Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992). 
 35. See Brian Glick & Matthew Rossman, Neighborhood Legal Services as House Counsel 
to Community Based Efforts to Achieve Economic Justice: The East Brooklyn Experience, 23 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 105 (1997); Susan Jones, Small Business and Community 
Economic Development: Transactional Lawyering for Social Change and Economic Justice, 4 
CLINICAL L. REV. 195 (1997); Peter Pitegoff, Child Care Enterprise, Community Development 
and Work, 81 GEO. L.J. 1897 (1993). 
 36. A description of TANF administration appears in Matthew Diller, The Revolution in 
Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion & Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1121 (2000). 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1).  The statute expressly restricts the regulatory authority of the 
Department of Health and Human Services.  Id. at § 617. 
 38. See Diller, supra note 36, at 1179-83.  See also RICHARD NATHAN & THEODORE GAIS, 
IMPLEMENTING THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1996: A FIRST LOOK 35-42 (1999). 
 39. See AMERICAN PUBLIC WELFARE ASS’N, DEVOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
AUTHORITY TO THE LOCAL LEVEL: WELFARE REFORM IN FIVE STATES (1998) [hereinafter 
DEVOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY]. 
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counties as block grants.40  In Ohio, counties enter into partnership agreements 
with the state that constitute the TANF plan for each locality.41 
Even absent these dramatic forms of devolution, many states are granting 
considerable flexibility to localities.  For example, many states require 
applicants for assistance to undertake job searches while their claims are 
pending.42  In many areas, the nature and contents of these requirements are 
left up to the localities.43  Similarly, considerable local discretion is often 
exercised in decisions to pay lump sum amounts to “divert” applicants from 
the welfare rolls.  Localities are also frequently accorded discretion in defining 
the content of work requirements. 
In shifting authority to states and localities, many TANF programs are also 
according greater discretion to their ground level administrative personnel.  In 
many places, the functions of ground level personnel are being redefined.  
Eligibility specialists, whose jobs were viewed as clerical, are being replaced 
by case managers with broad authority to advise, assist and supervise clients.44  
As one newspaper article put it, the case manager is intended to serve as “a 
teacher, preacher, friend and cop—an all-purpose partner to guide poor parents 
into jobs.”45 
In this new regime, agency personnel operate under many fewer rule based 
constraints.  Instead, program leadership is provided through performance 
based evaluation systems that link funding and other incentives to measurable 
outcomes.46  This new emphasis on outcomes is intended to replace fixed rules 
with a set of incentives intended to spur local agencies and contractors to 
produce particular results.47  In such a system, the key policy decisions are 
 
 40. See id. at 11-16 (describing Colorado’s TANF program); JANET QUINT ET AL., BIG 
CITIES AND WELFARE REFORM 79-80 (1999) (describing CalWORKS). 
 41. See DEVOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 27-32; Miriam 
Wilson & Charles F. Adams, Jr. Welfare Reform: Ohio’s Response, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1357 
(1999). 
 42. See KATHLEEN MALOY ET AL., A DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF STATE 
APPROACHES TO DIVERSION PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES UNDER WELFARE REFORM 32-40 
(1998). 
 43. Id. at 37. 
 44. DEVOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 27-32. 
 45. See Jason Deparle, For Caseworker, Helping is a Frustrating Struggle, NY TIMES, Dec. 
10, 1999, at A1, A26. 
 46. See Diller, supra note 36, at 1183-85. 
 47. The emphasis of welfare reform on performance measurement is part of a broad trend in 
public administration. See, e.g., Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 
103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993) (requiring federal agencies to prepare performance goals and 
measure and report outcomes in relation to these goals).  See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AND PROGRAM RISKS 10 (2001) (describing 
administrative reforms focused on “results-oriented and accountability based management 
approaches” intended to “deliver economical, efficient and effective programs and services to the 
American people”); Mary L. Heen, Reinventing Tax Expenditure Reform: Improving Program 
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reflected in outcome measurements and other performance incentives that give 
direction to the system as a whole.48 
In addition to this administrative restructuring of welfare, there have been 
major substantive shifts, as well as an infusion of resources.  Despite the 
Family Support Act of 1988,49 the AFDC program served principally as a 
means of income maintenance.  The principal function of the program was the 
payment of benefits to families who were eligible for assistance and who 
complied with program conditions.  In contrast, TANF programs are 
principally oriented toward getting recipient off the benefit rolls.  In some 
places, this emphasis may amount simply to a push to terminate assistance or 
to create barriers to entry.50  In other areas, greater attention may be paid to 
placing recipients in employment.51  Throughout the country, however, the 
rhetoric of promoting self sufficiency is overwhelmingly dominant. 
A final characteristic of the new welfare system is critically important.  
The new system is simply awash in money.  The abundance of resources is the 
result of a confluence of several factors.  First, the formula for which state 
TANF block grants are set is based on the federal funding levels of the AFDC 
program in the early 1990s.52  These levels were elevated due to the recession 
in the early part of the decade.  As caseloads have fallen, federal funding has 
remained constant, thus yielding a huge surplus of funds.  Although many 
states have siphoned off a portion of these funds for other purposes,53 there is 
no lack of money available for assisting low income families.  Second, as part 
of its promise to follow through on welfare reform, the Clinton Administration 
has goaded Congress into providing money on top of federal TANF funding.  
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 provided an additional 3 billion dollars to 
fund welfare to work programs administered by state and local governments 
during fiscal years 1998 and 1999.54  The funds are intended to assist long term 
 
Oversight Under the Government Performance and Results Act, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 751, 
756 (2000) (describing broad trend in public management to shift focus from “inputs” to 
“outputs”). 
 48. Diller, supra note 36, at 1185. 
 49. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343. 
 50. The City of New York provides a good example of such an approach.  See Reynolds v. 
Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d. 331 (S.D. N.Y. 1999). 
 51. See, e.g., VIRGINIA KNOX, ET AL., REFORMING WELFARE AND REWARDING WORK: A 
SUMMARY OF THE FINAL REPORT ON THE MINNESOTA FAMILY INVESTMENT PROGRAM (2000), 
at http://www.mdrc.org/Reports2000/MFIP/MFIPSummary.htm (reporting on results of 
Minnesota’s efforts to encourage and reduce dependence while also reducing poverty). 
 52. See 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(1). 
 53. See, e.g., Raymond Hernandez, Federal Welfare Overhaul Allows Albany to Shift Money 
Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2000, at A1 (reporting that the State of New York used over $ 1 
billion in federal TANF funding for purposes other than assisting the poor and noting that other 
states have similarly diverted welfare funds to other uses). 
 54. Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 5001. 
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welfare recipients in making the transition to work.  Furthermore, the strength 
of the economy has produced budget surpluses in many states and localities, 
thus reducing the pressure to take money out of the welfare system. 
Finally, the Work Force Investment Act of 199855 consolidated a number 
of federal job training programs and established a new structure for such 
programs.  Under the Act, recipients of public assistance are given a priority 
for enrollment in adult job training programs.56  The new law stresses local 
decision making and control, as funds are dispensed through state and local 
work force investment boards.57  In fact, 85 percent of the funding available for 
training adults is allocated at the local level.58  The Workforce Investment Act 
thus provides an additional source of funds that may be available to provide 
services to public assistance recipients. 
In sum, the TANF program differs from AFDC in at least four critical 
respects. Decision-making authority is shifted downward, as power is 
dispersed from the federal government to states, and from states to localities 
and private contractors.  Second, there is a trend toward increasing the 
discretion of ground level workers.  Many important features of TANF are not 
reflected in written rules of general applicability.  Agencies, however, steer the 
exercise of discretion through performance standards and other forms of 
incentives.  Third, on a rhetorical level, and to a certain extent in practice, the 
focus has shifted from income maintenance to the promotion of self sufficiency 
and work.  Finally, there is an abundance of funds available to create and 
sustain new initiatives. 
B. Advocacy Opportunities Under TANF 
These four changes have major ramifications for the nature of advocacy in 
the welfare system.  They further diminish the potential of litigation as a means 
of effecting broad changes in the welfare system.  As the system becomes 
fragmented, each administering agency is responsible for a smaller piece of the 
whole.  Correspondingly, there is less likely to be a single defendant in 
litigation who has broad control over the entire system.  As functions are 
devolved and contracted out to private service providers, the welfare system 
has become increasingly polycentric, characterized by the complex interaction 
of many players instead of a top-down hierarchy of power.  In this sense, 
welfare has come to resemble issues such as housing and health care. 
Moreover, as the discretion of lower level administrative personnel 
expands, litigation is less likely to be a simple matter of identifying and 
 
 55. Pub. L. No. 105-22. 
 56. Id. at § 134 (d)(4)(E). 
 57. See id. at §§ 111, 116. 
 58. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OVERVIEW OF THE WORKFORCE INVESTMENT ACT OF 1998, 
available at http://usworkforce.org/runningtext2.htm. 
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challenging an unlawful rule.  Instead, advocates must uncover and document 
the defacto policies that are cloaked by the language of discretion and then 
manage to identify some legal authority upon which to base a claim.  The days 
of bringing litigation by matching up one set of rules with another are largely 
in the past. 
On the other hand, taken together, the changes in the welfare system create 
new opportunities for community based welfare advocacy.  As localities and 
private contractors play increasingly important roles in the welfare system, 
advocacy must shift to the local level in order to be effective.  There are no 
fixed prescriptions for effective advocacy on the local level.  Advocates in 
each community need to identify the best means of influencing the 
administrative and political system in their county or city.  To do so, they must 
identify and, in many instances, create points of access to the key decision-
making processes. 
In some places, effective advocacy will center around county or municipal 
legislative bodies.  The New York City Council, for example, has played an 
increasingly active role in shaping policies with regard to workfare and 
assistance to the homeless.59  In other places, effective advocacy may target the 
executive branches.  In Philadelphia, for example, advocates worked closely 
with the Mayor in shaping the City’s implementation of welfare reform.60  
Programs funded by the Workforce Investment Act are overseen, in the first 
instance, by local Workforce Investment Boards.  Advocates may direct their 
efforts at influencing both the selection of board members and the decisions of 
these local boards.61 
In areas where aspects of welfare administration have been contracted out, 
advocates must seek involvement in the contracting process.  Critical decisions 
are generally reflected in the terms of the contract, such as the specification of 
contract requirements, the provisions governing payment to providers and the 
means of government oversight.  Together these elements of a contract 
establish the set of incentives that will, to a large extent, determine the manner 
in which a program is administered.  Unfortunately, there are few formal 
means of influencing the process by which these terms are established.62  
 
 59. See City of New York, Local Law 00/13 (grievance procedures for workfare program); 
City of New York, Local Law 00/14 (transitional jobs for public assistance recipients); City of 
New York, Local Law 99/06 (limits on size of emergency shelters for adults). 
 60. Biennan Center for Justice, Legal Services Lawyers Work Closely with Communities in 
Need, at 16 (2000) (reporting that Mayor Rendell invited community legal services to help 
develop strategies for dealing with federal welfare reform). 
 61. Local boards must have a majority of business representatives and representatives of 
labor organizations, community based organizations and service providers.  Board members are 
selected by local elected officials in accordance with criteria established by the governor of each 
state. 
 62. See Diller, supra note 36, at 1195-1206. 
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Nonetheless, advocacy in a privatized system is not necessarily futile.  
Advocates can develop creative means of influencing the way in which private 
contractors provide services. 
Public contracting procedures may provide a point of access to decision 
making under the TANF program.63  Advocates may be able to harness 
requirements designed to ensure the integrity of government contracting as a 
vehicle for input into the selection of private providers and, perhaps, as a way 
of influencing the substance of contracts with such providers.  Recent disputes 
over the process of contracting for welfare services in New York and San 
Diego illustrate some of the potential of such an avenue of advocacy.  In New 
York, accusations of influence peddling and failure to use competitive bidding 
derailed a $100 million dollar contract with Maximus, the large corporation 
selling welfare administrative services nationwide.64  Although the contracts 
were ultimately upheld in the courts, they have not gone forward as originally 
planned.65  In San Diego recipients and the union of public employees 
successfully sued to enjoin privatization of case management services.66  The 
court concluded that the county charter prohibited the “wholesale” contracting 
of discretionary functions such as case management.67 
In addition, advocates may be able to develop channels of communication 
with private welfare administrators.  Ironically, contractors may have a 
stronger interest in maintaining a positive public image than many government 
agencies.  The contracting process is frequently political and providers may 
wish to forestall vocal opposition from client advocates.  The large national 
companies who have recently entered the business of welfare administration 
may find it bad for business on a national level if they develop reputations for 
antagonizing local constituencies.  Indeed, conglomerates may be concerned 
that controversy over welfare issues will cut into the good will they have 
generated in other areas. 
For example, in August 1999, the New York Times revealed that 
Citigroup, the parent company of Citibank, which has been hired to administer 
the electronic benefits payment system for welfare recipients in 29 states, 
 
 63. See id. at 1198-99. 
 64. See Christopher Drew & Eric Lipton, 2 with Ties to Chief of Welfare Got Jobs with 
Major Contractor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2000, at A1; Eric Lipton, City Contracts for Workfare 
Are Criticized, NY TIMES, Mar. 14, 2000, at B1. 
 65. See Giuliani v. Hevesi, 276 A.D.2d 398, 715 N.Y.S.2d 12 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2000) 
(holding that New York City Mayor could override objections of New York City Comptroller).  
As of March 15, 2001, Maximus has not commenced operations in New York and it is not clear 
when it will do so.  Conversation with Glenn Passanen, the City Project, March 16, 2001. 
 66. See Karen Kucher, County CalWorks Pacts May be Illegal Judge Tentatively Rules 
Against Millions in Farmed-out Contracts, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 22, 2000, at B1; Karen 
Kucher, Lawsuit Targets Welfare Contracts, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 3, 1999, at B1. 
 67. Kucher, County CalWorks Pacts, supra note 66, at B1. 
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charged fees and imposed limitations on the use of ATM cards that it does not 
apply to its other customers.68  In anticipation of the article, Citibank officials 
immediately moved to provide greater access to cash in poor neighborhoods in 
New York.69  It may well be that the ameliorative moves were not significant 
in this instance,70 but the incident suggests that companies which spend 
millions in advertising to generate good will, may have reasons to respond to 
advocates for the poor.71 
Advocacy in this new landscape of fragmented and devolved welfare 
administration is likely to require a new set of skills and technical knowledge.  
Advocates must become adept at deciphering the gnarled prose of the contracts 
and agreements that frequently constitute the governing source of authority in 
the new system.  To be effective, advocates must be able to identify the key 
policy decisions in such documents and must learn to gauge the impact of the 
various oversight mechanisms that these documents frequently employ.  They 
must develop a concrete agenda of substantive and procedural points that they 
believe should be included in the instruments that bestow authority on 
contractors and localities. 
As part of this new set of skills, advocates must be develop expertise in 
performance based evaluation.  The task of formulating performance measures 
requires translating a set of policy goals into discrete quantifiable standards.  
Thus, the amorphous goal of promoting family well-being can be broken down 
into particular indices such as increases in income and earnings, or broader 
measures that look to infant mortality rates, school completion rates, eviction 
rates, levels of homelessness and so forth.  In a system centered on 
performance based evaluation, advocates must identify their goals and reduce 
them to a specific set of demands.  The task is complicated by the reality that 
agencies subject to performance measures generally look for the easiest means 
of achieving the measure, which frequently means finding ways to achieve 
statistical success, rather than attainment of more difficult overall objectives.  
Programs can look good on paper, while accomplishing little of value.  
Moreover performance measures that are too broad may be self defeating if 
their achievement is not within the control of agency that is subject to the 
standard.  Thus, a goal of reducing poverty may sound impressive but yield 
 
 68. See David Barstow, ATM Cards Fail to Live Up to Promises to Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug., 
16, 1999, at A1. 
 69. Id. 
 70. The bank announced it would install 25 ATMs in poor neighborhoods and enable 
recipients to use their cards in the NYCE network of 23,000 machines.  Id.  It did not, however, 
drop its fees or provide access through other networks. Id. 
 71. Investor relations offers another possible avenue of influence over private welfare 
administrators.  Campaigns may be organized to boycott the stock of companies that treat welfare 
recipients unfairly. 
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little results if the actors that are subject to the goal do not in fact have the 
means at their disposal to achieve the desired result. 
This discussion suggests that advocates must learn the art of analyzing and 
constructing performance standards.  The General Accounting Office has 
cautioned that many state and local governments do not have adequate 
experience and expertise to design and utilize performance measures 
effectively.72  For this reason, it is especially important that advocates monitor 
and participate in the process of formulating performance standards.  At the 
same time, advocates must themselves gain the skills necessary to play a 
constructive role and to gain credibility.73 
The shift in the welfare system from income support to work also requires 
welfare lawyers to develop new expertise in the problems facing low 
wageworkers.  Although the divide between the “working poor” and the 
“welfare poor” was always artificial, welfare lawyers did not generally focus 
on workplace issues.  Under welfare reform, however, work and welfare have 
become thoroughly intertwined:  Work is now frequently a requirement of 
benefit receipt and a variety of TANF related benefits might be available to 
those who work.  Events, which jeopardize a client’s job, also jeopardize her 
benefits case.  The need for advocates with expertise in the intersection of 
welfare and work is acute. 
This substantive shift in emphasis from the AFDC to the TANF program 
may actually invigorate efforts to activate communities around public benefits 
issues.  Lawyers interested in community organizing may be able to focus 
more directly on the welfare system than in the past.  Advocates can demand 
that welfare systems live up to the rhetoric of welfare reform by providing 
meaningful assistance to poor mothers in finding and retaining jobs.  
Moreover, advocates can work to improve the quality of life for mothers 
pushed into low wage jobs by seeking to use public benefits programs and 
other funding streams to create social supports for working parents.  Issues 
such as child care, transportation and health coverage are obvious subjects of 
advocacy. 
Advocacy around these issues may be particularly promising because it 
seeks to coopt the rhetoric of welfare reform, rather than simply serving as an 
exercise in resistance.  These issues may strike a chord in public opinion.  
After all, welfare reform was billed as a change in the manner and means of 
helping poor families, not simply as a process of abandonment. 
 
 72. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SERVICE PRIVATIZATION: EXPANSION 
POSES CHALLENGES FOR ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY OF PROGRAM RESULTS 17 (1997). 
 73. There is a substantial body of literature on performance measurement.  See, e.g., MARK 
FRIEDMAN, A GUIDE TO DEVELOPING AND USING PERFORMANCE MEASURES IN RESULTS-
BASED BUDGETING (1997), available at http://www.financeproject.org/measures.html.  See also 
HARRY HATRY, PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT: GETTING RESULTS (1999). 
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These issues may provide more effective focal points for community 
advocacy than did traditional income support issues.  First, clients may be 
more likely to organize and agitate around these issues because they reflect the 
desire of many clients to become self supporting.  As noted above, even though 
income support may have been vital to many families, clients were reluctant to 
organize around the issue because, individually, their goal was to leave the 
welfare rolls. 
The objectives of securing jobs and the social supports necessary to 
succeed in the workplace, however, coincide with mainstream American 
norms.  Recipients who organized to assert claims for income support sailed 
against the tide of social norms and risked being viewed as deviant.74  In 
contrast, recipients who agitate for training, better jobs, child care and so forth 
do not present claims that are likely to be perceived as threatening to dominant 
values.  For the same reason, leaders of institutions in low income 
communities may be more willing to champion the cause of welfare recipients, 
when it is centered on issues such as training, and child care, than when it 
simply focuses on income support.  They are more likely to perceive these 
issues as projecting positive images of their communities, while claims for 
income support may be perceived as reinforcing negative stereotypes. 
Second, as the locus of decision making is shifted down to the local level, 
community activism may be more relevant and effective because it is closer to 
the level at which meaningful programmatic decisions are made.  One of the 
insights of the environmental justice movement is that it is much easier to 
mobilize people around issues of immediate local concern, such as an 
undesirable land use in their neighborhood, than around broader more 
amorphous issues.  For much the same reason, the devolution of welfare is 
likely to make it easier to organize communities around issues relating to 
public benefits. 
Finally, community based advocacy around these issues is likely to be 
facilitated by the fact that there is ample money to fund new programs.  Thus, 
demands for new services and social supports present goals that are attainable.  
Welfare advocates can present a positive agenda that is realistic, rather than 
simply hoping to forestall cuts while arguing for affirmative measures that are 
patently beyond realm of possibility. 
Advocates can also create new roles for themselves in assisting community 
based service providers in obtaining government grants and contracts.  These 
groups frequently lack the expertise necessary to tap into sources of available 
government funding and to comply with the onerous administrative 
requirements that frequently accompany government funding.  Advocates can 
 
 74. See Lucy Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs 
Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1159, 1177-84 (1995) (describing negative 
reaction to welfare rights activists in the 1960’s). 
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help to fill these needs.  In fact, welfare advocacy may in some instances 
converge with community economic development work as welfare can serve as 
a funding stream for neighborhood day care and job training centers. 
C. Concluding Caveats and Cautionary Notes 
This discussion points to some reasons why the process of welfare reform 
may help invigorate community activism around welfare issues and identifies 
some important new roles that advocates can play.  These points are subject to 
two important caveats.  First, even in the new system, traditional elements of 
advocacy continue to be important.  Not everything that is transpiring under 
welfare reform is new.  Regulations are still written that violate statutory 
commands.75  Notices still go out that fail to provide proper information.76  
States still use hearing procedures that fall short of legal requirements.77  
Program rules may still transgress the limits of constitutionality.78  In other 
words, there will continue to be important issues that demand litigation.  
Similarly, on many issues state and national advocacy are still vitally 
important.  For example, the TANF program is up for reauthorization in 
Congress in 2002, a process fraught with opportunities and perils. 
Second, although the new system creates greater potential for local 
activism, emphasis needs to be placed on the term potential – as yet, it is far 
from clear whether the final product of welfare reform will be more open or 
more closed to input than its predecessor.  As I and others have argued 
elsewhere, devolution cannot be equated with openness or accessibility.79  
While the process has made a number of traditional advocacy tools less 
efficacious, devolution does not readily supply alternative means of assuring 
public input.  Instead, the central challenge for advocates is to forge a new set 
of strategies and tools that reflect the changing structure of public benefits 
programs.  Although this essay outlines a number of possibilities, it is far too 
early to discern the efficacy of these new techniques. 
 
 75. See Smith v. Commissioner of Transitional Assistance, 729 N.E.2d 627 (Mass. 2000) 
(striking down regulation limiting extensions of the time limit on benefits as violative of state 
statute); Minnefield v. McIntire, 11 Mass.L.Rptr. 369 (Super. Ct. Mass. 2000) (striking down 
regulation that impermissibly made it more difficult for caretakers of disabled children to receive 
exemptions from work requirements). 
 76. See Weston v. Hammons, Case No. 99 CV 412 (District Ct., City and Cy. of Denver, 
Nov. 5, 1999) (sanction notices in Colorado TANF program violate due process), available at 
http://www.welfarelaw.org/webbul/99novdec.htm#CO (sanction notices are constitutionally 
inadequate). 
 77. See Meachem v. Wing, 77 F. Supp.2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 78. See Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999) (striking down lower tier of benefits for new 
residents as unconstitutional). 
 79. See Diller, supra note 36, at 1206-10; see generally JOEL HANDLER, DOWN FROM 
BUREAUCRACY (1996). 
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Despite these caveats, it is clear that the major changes in the structure of 
the welfare system have profound ramifications for the nature and direction of 
welfare advocacy.  Welfare lawyers can now move from the periphery to the 
center of the movement toward community lawyering, as important 
programmatic decisions are increasingly made at the local level.  Although the 
multi-tiered layers of rules that characterized the AFDC program appeared to 
be dauntingly complex, the absence of rules has created a welfare system that, 
in comparison, makes the AFDC program look straightforward.  The number 
of players has increased, the arsenal of carrots and sticks used to exert control 
over recipients has expanded and the ability of the rules to constrain both 
policy makers and ground level administrators has diminished.  Within all this, 
advocates for people in poverty must identify the pivotal decision points and 
find or create opportunities to have an impact on the shape and content of the 
new welfare system. 
 
